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a b s t r a c t
Increasingly countries are turning to nonproﬁt organisations to provide health and social care,
particularly for people with disabilities. Alongside this change, debates continue about how states
should manage the relationship with such organisations. Should features of the old-style ‘‘welfare’’
model be retained? Should aspects of the ‘‘new public management’’ model be chosen to measure the
impact of the work? Yet others argue that grassroots organisations should form the basis of a service
provision system. In the context of these debates, Ireland serves as an interesting case study of the
system of care that can emerge when the state operates a ‘‘relaxed control’’ approach. This paper takes
the perspectives of users themselves: family carers who are accessing services for a disabled adult child,
to examine the effects of this approach on the ground. We show how geography played a central role in
shaping these experiences, and discuss how we can learn from the Irish context. Rather than arguing for
narrowly deﬁned contractual measures, we conclude by proposing a renewed focus on relationship
building with the aim of effective system operation, in the future of care services.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, the effective operation of health service delivery
in general, and services to people with disabilities in particular, is
dependent upon nonproﬁt organisations. This trend has emerged
after years of political and ideological debate about the potential
for voluntarism to resolve governments’ ﬁscal and administrative
problems, with regard to the provision of services (Salamon et al.,
2003). Our paper is therefore written at an interesting time of
change, and addresses debates regarding the relationship be-
tween state and voluntary organisations relevant to this change.
To assist such debates, this paper examines a unique case study of
Ireland to show the local level implications of a particular service
model on family carers of people with disabilities. Ireland is seen
as an important site of study, given that the Irish state has an
unusually long history of drawing on local, relatively autonomous,
voluntary organisations within a relatively decentralised mon-
itoring framework in the provision of care services. 1 Moreover,
particular features of the Irish service provision landscape parallel
those being called for by advocates of a ‘hands-off’ provision
model.
In this paper, we examine the implications of Ireland’s hands-
off decentralised model on the local landscape of service delivery,
and explore what lessons can be learned. At the heart of the
landscape of care provision are the families of people with
disabilities. These groups continually use a whole range of
services offered by nonproﬁt providers, including day care,
occupational training and nursing care. In this paper, we focus
on family users, echoing authors who argue for the importance of
hearing and understanding the concerns of stakeholders, when
researching social policy implications (e.g., Morgan et al., 2002).
We draw on narratives of family carers, as they describe their
experiences of accessing such services. Interviews were con-
ducted with 25 such people (C. 1–25) in suburban hinterlands in
North County Dublin and neighbouring County Kildare.
Our paper is structured as follows: ﬁrst, we introduce current
debates regarding the role of nonproﬁt organisations in the
provision of care services. Next, we present a history of state–
nonproﬁt relationships in Ireland, in order to contextualise our
case study. We describe the implicit model of care provision in
Ireland, to set the scene for our study. We then present our
empirical ﬁndings, in which we examine perspectives of family
carers and their experiences of Ireland’s ‘‘geographies of care’’.
Our ﬁndings address the burgeoning interdisciplinary interest in
the voluntary sector as both the subject and context for inquiry
within health geography by examining the complex ways in
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which the Ireland’s ‘hands-off’ approach is experienced at the
ground level. Finally, we return to examine international debates
in light of our case study and consider an alternative model by
which state–nonproﬁt relationships might be managed. Rather
than argue for a move towards state-centred welfare provision, or
New Public Management-style monitoring, both of which are seen
as problematic, we suggest that an ‘experimentalist’ model, as
identiﬁed by Sabel (2006) provides a new alternative.
2. State–nonproﬁt relations: some views
Across the Western world, states are increasingly unable to cope
with providing health and social care services. In response to this,
many governments are using nonproﬁt organisations for service
provision (Salamon et al., 2000). Van Til (2007), for example, reports
how such changes are taking place within the Dutch sphere, with
Kramer (1990) noting similar situations in Germany, Belgium,
Switzerland, Austria and Italy. Questions are emerging regarding
how best to manage relationships between these sectors. Here, we
outline some relevant topics of debate, focusing on the interrelated
issues of centralisation, accountability and autonomy. Two points
are important to note: ﬁrst, while these issues are not exclusive to
state–nonproﬁt sector governance, they emerged as particularly
important and relevant in the context of the data collected for this
study. Much more could be written about state–nonproﬁt relation-
ships, but given the limited scope of this paper, we wish to
particularly focus on the features that relate to our data. This is in
line with best practice in qualitative research, in which pertinent
themes emerge from the data and are allowed to guide the
subsequent analysis (Blumer, 1954). Second, the different sides of
these debates emerge typically from critiques of different models of
welfare. In particular, the ‘welfare state’ model and ‘new public
management’ models are generally presented as opposing sides in
the debate over best practice governance. While these models to
some extent drive the discussion in this paper, in terms of how they
are positioned in these debates, it is worth noting that in practice,
service delivery structures vary across countries in more complex
ways than indicated by such models. Each country’s service
provision typically draws on features from across a range of models
(Arnold, 2007). For these reasons, we focus on the following themes
which remain central to current debates.
2.1. Centralisation
One key topic of debate which emerged involves centralisa-
tion. To what extent should services be coordinated from a central
locus? Under the model of state-centred welfare provision used
by a number of countries, decision-making is centralised in order
to achieve an even spread of standards across a range of
organisations. The idea is that access to services would be more
equitable (De Vries, 2007). Similarly, with regard to the informa-
tion that is available to users at the local level, it is often useful to
have a centralised point of access (Hood, 1991).
Centralised provision of state services has attracted much
criticism however. One critique involves an inherent ‘‘claim to
universality’’ which persists in centralised welfare provision
(Hood, 1991: 8). In other words, the idea that one size ﬁts all, or
that one form of governance will suit the myriad different types of
health provision, is seen to be problematic. Critics argue that
remote decision makers have little understanding of what is
happening at the local context, and that this is reﬂected in poor
decisions and inappropriate choices for service users (Ackroyd,
1995). In the UK for example, many Primary Care Trusts have
expressed disappointment in their inability to pursue locally
deﬁned agendas (Wilkin et al., 2002). For Le Grand (1999), NPM-
style reforms in the British NHS had minimal success, which was
partly to do with the fact that centralised control was retained.
For some, therefore, decentralisation of public services is the
best way forward, and offers a means to overcome ‘‘the
limitations of centrally controlled national planning by delegating
greater authority to ofﬁcials working in the ﬁeld, closer to the
problems’’ (De Vries, 2007: 197). It also allows organisations to be
ﬂexible, responsive and represent diverse improvements in the
way in which mental health services are delivered.
Because they are based in communities, voluntary groups are
active at a local level and their agendas are driven by the
priorities and needs of people at the local level, rather than by
national strategies and policies directives. This means that
they can understand the needs and priorities of their local
areas and can respond with innovative ideas and provide
ﬂexibility for the development of these ideas and action.
(Department of Health and Children, 2006)
In other words, local organisations can truly understand the
needs of their clients and can provide more targeted, appropriate
services without being subject to more abstract, disconnected
policies and directives that are formulated at the national level.
2.2. Accountability
If a state is engaging a nonproﬁt organisation to provide
particular services, how should the organisation demonstrate its
accountability to the state? The question raises the issue of
monitoring: the introduction of clear measures of progress and
impact, and ensuring that these are met. Authors tend to agree that
some form of monitoring is vital in order for states to gain a good
service from the organisations to which they are entrusting their
service provision (Arnold, 2007). Even with its problems, countries
introducing tighter monitoring models under ‘‘new public manage-
ment’’ (NPM) initiatives have seen increased ﬁnancial account-
ability in areas of procurement, for example (Hood, 1991).
However, authors note how close bureaucratic monitoring can
hamper organisations in carrying out their work, given the inherent
slowness that this brings (Barnett and Barnett, 2006). Close
monitoring can tie up organisations and prevent them from carrying
out their work of service provision. This has particular implications for
the end users who often feel they cannot design their own support
arrangements. Where tightly proscribed contracts have been used,
voluntary organisations risk losing ﬂexibility, innovation and dyna-
mism (see for example, Salamon et al., 2003). Under recent NPM
initiatives, contract-style outsourcing has begun using quantitative,
calculable metrics of ‘‘impact’’ requiring tight speciﬁcation of what is
to be carried out, and the expected results of the work, by the
provider. Critics argue that these types of performance measurements
are inappropriate for health and social care (Thomas and Davies,
2005). A further issue is that the process of negotiating contracts and
adhering to monitoring procedures often works in favour of larger
over smaller organisations (Barnett and Barnett, 2006).
2.3. Autonomy
Related to the above issues is the question of autonomy. How
independent should service providers be? Under the ‘‘welfare
provision’’ model, for example, much control remains with the
state, as services are provided through the public sector. This has
both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it is seen to
bring about greater professionalism, and more transparency with
regards to funding. On the other hand, Noonan et al. (2008) argue
that command-and-control types of welfare governance constrict
agencies’ abilities to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, to
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increase their capacities where needed, and to tailor their
responses to diverse clienteles.
Of particular interest in this paper is the idea, shared by many
critics, that service provision needs to become more autonomous. In
response to issues such as those raised above, new and autonomous
organisations are emerging, which tend to operate independently in a
‘bottom-up’ fashion, responding directly to the needs of users. This
gives users more choice in the supports they want. Much of the policy
literature from across developed countries describes the potential for
such autonomous organisational forms to effectively address histor-
ical problems in service provision (Milligan and Conradson, 2006;
Salamon et al., 2003). For example, Van Til (2007), citing cases in
Germany, France, Egypt and the US, points to new groups of nonproﬁt
organisations emerging which claim to provide a more community-
focused service provision, which are ‘‘more people-friendly than those
emerging from bureaucracies’’ (p. 37).
For some, the sheer size and inherent bureaucracy of
traditional welfare provision models are inherently unequal and
preclude diversity of choice (Popay et al., 1999). They have also
been criticised for ‘‘hierarchical forms of delivery in which
knowledge meant power and in which users had little say or
control’’ (Popay et al., 1999: 3). Feminist and anti-racist groups,
such as women’s health groups and Saturday schools for black
children have long been arguing for alternative, often separate
forms of welfare based on smaller, autonomous organisations
(Popay et al., 1999: 11). These agencies reject the search for
universality, in favour of celebration of diversity and difference.
Autonomous organisations are therefore seen to have the
inherent potential to be more innovative and ﬂexible than larger,
state-wide bureaucracies. The idea is that these organisations are
not constrained by dictates from the centre, but offer pluralistic,
people-driven approaches to service provision. Their emergent
nature enables them to be developed for particular subgroups
existing in a range of local settings. Such organisations also
provide a space for debate and dialogue on how particular social
problems should be resolved.
We have described above some questions that underscore
state–nonproﬁt relations pertaining to the areas of centralisation,
accountability, and autonomy. These are key concerns for those
involved in designing or maintaining service provision models in
any country context. It is clear from the above discussion that
both the welfare state and, to a greater extent, the NPM type
models are often reluctant to relinquish central governance,
regulation, and autonomy to local agencies or to service users. As
a result, the service user is often overlooked and negatively
impacted. From the above overview, we see that certain features
are implied as being best for users of disability services. It appears
that a system in which local level organisations are in charge of
offering services, are enabled to make their own autonomous
choices with little interference from the centre, and remain free of
the burden of continuous monitoring and reporting, would be
best. Such a system would enable services to emerge that ﬁt the
speciﬁc needs of users themselves, and organisations would be
able to redesign these services in a fast and ﬂexible way. In this
paper, we take a closer look at this somewhat utopian vision. We
examine one country context, that of Ireland, and ask whether the
implied beneﬁts for users are within reach. Before describing the
ﬁndings, the following section brieﬂy paints the context of service
provision in Ireland, in which the research took place.
3. Background to nonproﬁt contracting in Ireland
Ireland serves as an interesting case study in light in this
debate. Ireland has one of the world’s largest nonproﬁt sectors
(representing 11.5% of non-agricultural employment in 1995),
second only to the Netherlands in Salamon et al.’s 22 country
study (2000). Here, geographically dispersed, local nonproﬁt
groups have for years dominated health and social care provision
for people with disabilities. Given its strong legacy of small-scale,
decentralised approaches to health and social care services,
Ireland may serve as an interesting study region for other
countries in which this form is being considered as a potentially
useful model of service provision.
Since the establishment of the Irish State in 1922, the principle
of subsidiarity has been important in guiding state–nonproﬁt
relations. This principle involves the State adopting a hands-off
approach; only needing to step in as a last resort when other
service providers, such as the parish, local community or
voluntary organisation, are seen to fail. The ﬂedgling Irish state
had few resources to support such provision, and saw the Catholic
Church as potentially being able to take on this responsibility.
Interestingly, at the outset, there was a scarcity of religious orders
willing to undertake this work, but after considerable grants of
land and buildings were promised in the early 1950s, the Catholic
Church obliged (Ryan, 1999: 121).
The formalisation of this relationship can be seen in the terms
of the Health Act, 1953, which established Section 65 grants2 to
nonproﬁt organisations providing ‘similar or ancillary’ services to
those of the State (Donoghue, 2002). This funding model provides
global grants directly to the agencies on the basis of the previous
year’s ﬁnancial outturn, proposals to improve or expand services,
and the availability of ﬁnance generally (Ryan, 1999). As long as
the outcomes that were originally proposed by the service
provider are shown to have been met by the end of the year,
there is little transparency on how money has been spent.
Amounts spent on staff, transport and care remain opaque.
Moreover, there is typically little connection between the size of
the grant and the numbers cared for, the category or the degree of
disability (C&AG, 2005). The inherent freedom granted to
recipient organisations remains a characteristic of the Irish
system today.
With such a relaxed system, service providers are by and large
able to carry on their work immune to criticism. Historically, the
lack of monitoring beneﬁted the State in that they could depend
on the church to carry on with the business of disability provision,
without taking upon itself burdens related to the ‘problem of the
handicapped’ (Department of Health, 1960). Since then, from the
mid-1960s onwards, there has been a signiﬁcant increase in
secular nonproﬁt agencies, particularly parent organisations,
providing similar services. However the system of devolved
responsibility for disability provision has remained and typically
requires few checks and reporting systems.
Despite recommendations from a White Paper (Department of
Social, Community and Family Affairs, 2000), which advocated
jointly developed service agreements, these still read like high-
level, somewhat abstract guidelines that merely describe the ideal
principles of engagement, in broad terms. In practice, these do not
specify details of how to structure relationships. Monitoring is
thus rare and, where it is in place, is poorly carried out. As
Donoghue (2002) notes, the White Paper exists ‘‘more in the
realm of rhetoric than practice’’ in today’s service provision
(p. 15).
2 Section 65 of the Health Act, 1953 allowed the health services (known as the
health boards from 1970) to provide funding to voluntary organisations for health
and related purposes. ‘Section 65 funding’, as it became known, became the largest
source of funding for voluntary and community organisations in the state and
health boards took a broad social view of the type of services that these
organisations should provide. They have since been renamed Section 39 grants,
after the Health Act, 2004.
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Evidence of this lenient relationship has come to light recently
with a national audit of nonproﬁt disability service providers, by
the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG). Its report (2005)
found a widespread failure among organisations, many of which
were secular, to provide audited ﬁnancial statements or disclose
levels of executive pay. The audit of 42 organisations found that
12 groups did not ﬁle accounts for 2003. In particular, one large
organisation which received h288 m during 2000–2004 had not
provided ﬁnancial statements for these four years. Furthermore,
according to the same report, visits to three Health Service
Executive (HSE) regional ofﬁces found that the information
captured from their monitoring processes was not systematically
used for evaluating service provision.
In short, we conceptualise Ireland’s model of care provision as
one of ‘‘Relaxed Control’’. The features of this are summarised in
Fig. 1 below.
We see from our overview of debates on nonproﬁt relation-
ships with the state that Ireland’s model contains features that
might be seen as desirable for those calling for change to current
systems of service provision. It is at once decentralised, with
relaxed accountability demands, and high levels of autonomy for
service providers. We might expect that users would experience a
personalised, ﬂexible and responsive service under such a
‘‘relaxed control’’ model. Ireland thus serves as an interesting
and timely case study in debates over greater or lesser statutory
governance, and the degree of regulation and monitoring of the
nonproﬁt sector. To unpack this debate further, it is important to
move beyond the abstract state level and examine the implica-
tions of this service model on service users themselves. From our
study, we can see how the relaxed model of governance seems to
affect actual service delivery.
4. Findings: implications for today’s geography of care
This section examines family carers’ particular experiences of
gaining access to services. Geographical issues emerge as central,
in relation to access to care. For families, the implications of the
service landscape outlined in the previous section were evident in
their appraisal of the service providers. All caregivers were caring
for people with learning disabilities3 aged between 18 and 30. The
services in their jurisdiction originated as grass-roots parents’
organisations and grew over time to provide essential services for
adults with learning disabilities in their vicinity. They operate in
areas with increasing young commuter populations, thus are
under similar pressures to provide services to this expanding
population. Both areas have also seen a decrease in the
availability of ‘‘natural supports’’ in the form of friends and
family, given the rise of dual-earner households in the area. The
organisations operate in an autonomous manner, responsible for
their own management and budgeting, and for designing their
care service. These organisations remain representative of the
model of service provision in the Irish landscape, described above.
It is also worth noting that research for this case study was
conducted during a period of signiﬁcant economic growth,
dubbed the ‘Celtic Tiger’ by commentators. This period has now
passed, leaving providers operating under new budget con-
straints. At the time of the study, these were signiﬁcantly less
and did not overtly affect the ﬁndings.
4.1. No information: no input
At the outset, families complained about a gap in information
coordination. Information was not forthcoming in advance,
leaving families often unable to plan for the future:
She wants to do courses, you know, she wants to better herself.
So I was just told we have to wait until March to know if there
is a place for her. So I said, ‘you are actually telling me that you
do not know if she is going to be accepted or not?’ and now, if
she is not accepted, where do I go from there? (C. 20)
Here, we see the confusion that accompanied the lack of
available information. This information was not forthcoming from
the service provider largely because the number of places
available was unknown at the time the parent approached the
organisation. In addition, the service provider was reluctant to
accept new clients because of the potential resource demands
involved. This lack of ﬂexibility brings to mind a monolithic non-
responsive organisation, characteristic of a centralised top-down
service, rather than the grass-roots type of model the system is
supposed to deliver.
The carers claimed that the information deﬁcit was a major
problem. Carers argued that such a lack of information on what
was available felt like a smoke-screen for the service users:
It is almost like a smokescreen. There are services there but
nobody tells you. There is not that much you can do. You
cannot ﬁght the system, you are just at their mercy really.
(C. 3)
The above quote also evokes the helplessness inherent to the
lived experience of dealing with an opaque, non-responsive
organisation. In addition, carers reported that many of the
decisions made about services for school leavers with disabilities
were made without their input. Generally carers felt that the
information that was available was limited to what each
Hands-Off Funding:  A hands-off attitude by the governing State to the way in which 
global grant funding is spent 
Autonomous
Agencies:
Individual agencies are encouraged to carry out their work as 
they see fit, with little monitoring and calculation of the 
effectiveness of care.  Funding is largely independent of such 
metrics.
Local Services by 
Local Organisations:
Provision of care in any one area in Ireland is contingent on the  
availability of local services, with local organisations providing 
these services.
Fig. 1. Main Characteristics of Ireland’s ‘‘Relaxed Control’’ Model.
3 Learning disability is a problematic and complex concept given that its
meaning and interpretation can vary; generally it is deﬁned as having long-term
impaired intelligence and social functioning (Department of Health, 2001).
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autonomous organisation considered to be relevant, rather than a
community-wide focus. This is redolent of organisations being
stuck in silos, meaning that they rarely engaged with other bodies
outside of their disability remit.
This silo mentality was also evident in the recent Comptroller
report (2005), which found that information systems within the
HSE (in relation to their disability services) were generally
underdeveloped, making it difﬁcult for managers to obtain a
clear picture of what was taking place in the various organisations
operating across the country. It appears, therefore, that our
respondents’ sense of frustration at an opaque system, in which
information was difﬁcult to obtain, reﬂects the ﬁndings of this
report.
4.2. Access—getting a place
Interviewees spoke about how their caregiving experiences
were strongly inﬂuenced by the control that particular organisa-
tions had over the landscape of care provision. In a given
geographical area, it is the individual, autonomous organisations
that decide what services they should offer. These organisations
also decide who should be allowed to avail of their services. This
manifested itself in a number of problematic ways. First, many of
the carers argued that they found it difﬁcult to get a place with
the service provider in their designated area, due to the
autonomous gate-keeping capacity of organisations.
A second problem involved the fact that even when people
were allocated a place, these were often unsuitable. In some cases,
people whose particular disability does not ‘ﬁt’ the service
provider’s remit, ﬁnd themselves outside of the system, unable
to obtain the help that they need:
We applied to St. [Pauls] andy they were not too keen on
taking him because he had not got Down’s Syndrome. And they
were saying we could put him out in the ordinary school. We
stood up and said. ‘you could not put him into a normal
school’. He could not speak. They taught him sign-language.
Prior to that, he was like an explosive bomb. It was terrible. So
in the end they took him. They did not really want to take him.
And what do you do if they say we do not want to take
him?—keep him at home? Send him to a school and they
would ring you up and say, ‘take him out of here please’. (C. 4)
In this case, we see how a young adult with profound autism
was caught in a position where he had no choice in the day
support he could receive. In a region where the local service
provider focussed on caring for people with Down’s Syndrome,
the carer was left with no choice but to accept an inappropriate
placement. The only other solution was to care for the child
without day support at home. As another interviewee notes:
If you do not slot into their box, it is quite bureaucratic. And it
is either a take it or leave it scenario. (C. 15)
According to Ryan (1999), because of the autonomy of service
providers, the disability has to ﬁt into what the agencies wish to
provide. If the agency does not wish to cater for that disability, the
person with that disability does without: ‘‘that is what happens
when a government cedes control of a service to autonomous
agencies’’ (p. 128).
A further issue concerns the way in which organisations design
their menus of service options and how they categorise particular
disabilities. Where a child has behavioural problems as well as a
particular disability, the system has no way of catering for this
situation. Carers reported implicit expectations, on behalf of the
organisations that they were dealing with, that the person being
cared for does not have any behavioural problems, extra
impairments or health problems:
It depends again—if your child is very good, you will get
respite. If your child has diabetes and a heart condition, you
would not get respite. (C. 16)
In summary, we learned three ways in which carers experi-
enced problems due to the way particular autonomous organisa-
tions had structured their disability service. Firstly, obtaining a
place was often difﬁcult, and secondly, even where a place was
secured, this was frequently unsuitable to the disability in
question. Finally, where people experienced more complex issues,
such as behavioural problems, organisations were often simply
unwilling or unable to provide the necessary help.
4.3. Choice—switching between places
Service providers tend to operate within ‘‘catchment areas’’
which generally match a county boundary, and this tends to
hinder service users’ ability to switch service provider. Generally,
there is one service for a particular disability per jurisdiction. As
noted above, if the service provider decides not to accept a person
with a disability, there is often little else available in the same
coverage area. This reﬂects a general lack of choice available to
service users. Family carers felt that they could either use the local
service, even if it was inappropriate, or as an alternative, be left
with nothing:
They sent [Joe] home one day [for aggressive behaviour], and
they rang and said do not send him in again. So basically he has
never had a service since. He had just gone 18. It was basically
January. I was in touch with the Health boards, they were
saying ‘could we not manage to make a compromise between
us and St. [Pauls]’? It did not dawn on me, that they did not
have another service. In their minds, St. [Pauls] had taken him
on and so that was it, he was theirs forever more. It was their
tough luck and it was my tough luck too. Sure eventually they
were just told to take him back to St. [Pauls], you know, the
very place that had thrown him out. At that stage we were
expected to get down on our knees and for them to do
whatever they wanted. (C. 24)
Carers frequently found that they were trapped in instances
like this, with little choice, as a result of where they were living.
Moreover, carers felt that they were denied the option of going
to another service provider. They argued that they often could not
seek services in other jurisdictions, when they were under the
umbrella of a nearby service provider. Carers were genuinely
frustrated by this lack of choice and access:
If you were going with one service, they would not let you use
another. Like at [St. Pauls]; he has not had speech therapy since
August. The speech therapist is on maternity leave. There is
only one. And he is not allowed to use any other service for
speech therapy because he is under the umbrella of [St. Pauls].
I mean, they sent me home an information pack to work with
him. But I am not a speech therapist. I do my best but I have
two other children. (C. 3)
Unfortunately, as this carer identiﬁed, if a family wants to
move to another organisation, the funding allocated to the
organisation does not follow the person; it stays with the original
service provider (Broderick, 2009). This is because autonomous
service providers are responsible for ﬁnding their own funding,
and tend not to want to pass funding onto other organisations.
This reﬂects the lack of portability in the sector and can force
carers into a very difﬁcult situation in which they must make
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decisions on whether to move jurisdiction, in response to
inadequate services being available where they live. This is not
an easy choice and can be full of additional risk, given that they
have to undergo a brand new assessment because of separate
HSEA regional structures. This general reluctance to relinquish
funds on behalf of service providers leads to a geographic
‘‘trapping’’ of families into their allocated regions.
4.4. Power—service-centred, not people-centred
In many cases, we heard from carers that service provider
organisations tend to operate to meet their own ends, and not for
the interests of the users.
While they all talk about person-centred planning, and they all
talk the talk, when you actually go to look for a service, if you
are not within their service, if what you want is not in their
service, just forget it. It is actually a waste of time. (C. 15)
Rather than a person-centred service, carers often felt they
were dealing with a mechanistic organisation, with a conservative
ethos, more concerned with the internal work of meeting the
present needs of the organisation than responding to their needs
and helping them. One carer, who also worked in a care advocacy
group, claimed that the disability services work simply to their
own needs:
I think the services are not there to meet the needs of the
community, of the carer, or the person they are caring for. It is
slow, it is cumbersome, it does not operate to the needs of the
carer, it operates to the needs of the system. The system
operates it, not the patients. So it is the system working for the
system, not for the people. (C. 1)
According to Osbourne (1998), these traits are characteristic of
bureaucratic organisations whose mission and goals have drifted
over time, such that the organisation works to meet its own
needs. This concept of ‘‘goal displacement’’ in organisations can
lead to people following a cycle, where internal rules and
procedures are followed at the expense of the original mission
of the organisation (Merton, 1957). In Ireland, this may be related
to the fact that organisations have in some cases grown rapidly in
size, in response to increasing numbers of service users. For
example, some day services cater for up to 400 individuals, where
they have not been set up to do this. Also, disability services in
certain regions have to confront the emphasis placed on the
‘medical’ by funding bodies in less progressive health service
areas, which frequently comes at the expense of the ‘‘social’’.
These service expansions and outside challenges can lead to
complexity in organisational systems, technocratic practices of
rule-following, and a tendency to be swept up in agendas and
pressures that often have little to do with their founding purpose.
Yet, families are still asked to have faith that these systems can be
trusted to be attentive to the needs of people who may be
inarticulate, powerless and acutely vulnerable in their depen-
dency on them (Broderick, 2009).
5. Discussion
We have seen here how the ‘‘relaxed control’’ model of state–
nonproﬁt relationships can play out at the local level. In this
paper, we describe just such a landscape: one in which care is
provided by spatially diverse, autonomous groups. As we saw,
many authors discussing the provision of public services are
advocating for local, democratic and autonomous units to provide
such services. However, we see in the ﬁndings that these features
are not without their problems. When we add these insights from
carers’ experiences to the more macro issues of lack of central
control, coordinated services, or accountability, we see that there
are a number of signiﬁcant disadvantages to Ireland’s model.
Returning to wider debates on state–nonproﬁt relations, it
appears that while ongoing, tightly speciﬁed monitoring has its
critics, without some form of monitoring, the problems that users
at the ‘‘ground level’’ experience, can go unnoticed. From this, we
argue that while the kinds of quantitative metrics that tend to be
introduced alongside NPM changes might be unsuitable, a form of
monitoring that focuses on users of the service themselves, is
essential. The problem with autonomous, independent organisa-
tions providing disability services is that these organisations are
the sole guarantors of access. Where carers are experiencing
problems with the system, such as frustration with being trapped
in a particular area, there appears to be little way for their voices
to be heard. A system of appropriate monitoring, based on carers’
concerns being listened to and addressed, appears to be needed.
Regarding the issue of centralisation, in Ireland we can see that
problems persist in terms of access to information, and coordina-
tion across services. While Osborne, De Vries and other critics of
centralisation argue that such a system prevents local practi-
tioners from responding quickly and adequately to needs of users,
this appears to be related to an ideal case. In any event, it does not
appear to be the experience of carers we came in contact with.
Nor did a decentralised system bring about better representation
for diverse groups. In fact, those with unusual situations, such as
behavioural problems, found themselves outside of the system,
with nowhere to go. Despite the rhetoric around local organisa-
tions, in the Irish context it appears that the reality can fall short.
It appears that the autonomy of organisations can engender a
reluctance or a refusal to cooperate, to share information, to
transfer funding and to facilitate people moving from one area
to another. Finally, the fact that organisations provide services to
suit themselves means that users are conﬁned to ‘‘ﬁtting in’’ to the
care that is being offered, and have little choice in what is offered.
We see how this landscape of service provision can lead to a
trapping of carers into their own geographical region. Rather than
being ‘‘user-led’’, such services are driven by the mission of the
organisations themselves.
We see how these observations contribute to debates on how
state–nonproﬁt relationships might be managed. As an alternative
to state-controlled welfare provision or NPM, autonomous service
provision is not necessarily the answer. This paper has outlined
some important insights into why this is so. From looking at the
speciﬁc applied aspects of service supply, demand and choice, the
local autonomy evident in the Irish model can be as much a trap
and a constraint, as an advantage in terms of ﬂexibility and
responsiveness.
5.1. An alternative model
It appears that a model incorporating appropriate forms of
monitoring, where users’ voices are heard, and where organisa-
tions are subject to some forms of centralised planning, might be
appropriate. We are not arguing for an increase in neo-liberal
style competitive contracting however. We see clearly from our
interview respondents that their concerns are not being heard. It
is unlikely that an even more competitive and autonomous
architecture would ameliorate this problem (Marsh and Spies-
Butcher, 2007). In addition, we see from the ﬁndings that a degree
of centralisation appears to be needed. Notwithstanding the
criticisms of hierarchical structures and centralised welfare
provision, without some level of standardisation of information
and service options, people will continue to be blocked from
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moving freely from one area to another, without the need for
reassessment.
In concluding, we propose that a middle-way model be sought.
The changed agenda in the delivery of health and disability
services indicates the need for a system based on an integrated
learning process that enables effective ongoing policy develop-
ment, resourcing and capacity development, along with imple-
mentation. In reﬂecting these goals, an alternative framework for
purchaser–provider relationships in human services has been
championed by Sabel. This has been dubbed the ‘experimentalist’
or pragmatist approach, and shifts the emphasis in exchanges
between state and provider from a primarily punitive to a
primarily learning basis.
This broad approach has been widely tested in a variety of
human services and other public policy settings in the United
States, including child welfare in Alabama and Utah (Noonan
et al., 2008), enhancing interagency collaboration among public
health agencies and private community-based programmes
(Noonan et al., 2008), and occupational health and safety (Lieb-
man and Sabel, 2003). Experimental principles deﬁne an approach
to the management of purchaser–provider relations that is wholly
different from the structure that now governs many neo-liberal
welfare states.
Under Sabel’s schema, a number of decrees exist which guide
the experimentalist model: ﬁrstly, basic norms – guidelines –
must be both learned and elaborated in the course of practice.
Reconﬁgured training of staff, including the introduction of
mentoring partnerships is helpful in this regard. Secondly, a
new conception of the relation between central administration
(government or relevant department) and the frontline (staff
dealing with the clients) emerges. The centre articulates general
goals, provides support for the frontline, and monitors its success
in vindicating the principles. Thirdly, change is incremental, to
enable the process of learning (Noonan et al., 2008).
Discussing the practice of monitoring in the Irish context,
Arnold (2007) notes that future changes in service provision must
include ‘‘a greater level of accountability and a demonstration of
effective management’’, and argues that nonproﬁts in Ireland
generally require improvement in this respect (p. 78). In terms of
the tools used to determine best practice, and monitor relation-
ships, Sabel’s approach proposes to reverse the direction and
substance of the exchange between purchasers and providers and
to move away from ﬁxed rules, towards enabling the continuous
evaluation of possible changes in the rules:
Accountability thus requires not comparison of performance to
a goal or rule, but reason giving. (Sabel, 2006: 14)
In this model, evaluation of a service provider is carried out
with the input of other agencies in a process of ongoing mutual
reﬂection. Here, we would draw on the ﬁndings of our study to
argue that monitoring must incorporate a user-focus, with voices
of carers themselves being heard. For Sabel then, monitoring is
continuous, or nearly so, rather than occasional or episodic: and it
is less interested in outcome measures than with diagnostic
information—information that can redirect the method of provi-
sion (Marsh and Spies-Butcher, 2007).
Often when service providers fail to follow the rule in
command-and-control systems, they stand to be immediately
penalised. In pragmatist systems, inability or unwillingness to
improve or respond to change at an acceptable rate triggers
initially increased capacity, enhancing assistance from the centre.
Repeated failure to respond, even with assistance, is, however,
likely to bring about penalties for the offending service (Sabel,
2006). As we noted in the context of debates on whether
organisations should operate in an autonomous capacity or not,
in order for the beneﬁts of decentralised, independent service
provision to emerge; such autonomy must be facilitated by
appropriate structures. For example, while local organisations can
bring beneﬁts such as greater representation for diverse mino-
rities, and more rapid response to user needs; this must be
supported by the wider system.
Of course, in shifting towards an experimentalist architecture,
much remains to be done to work out particular details in relation
both to the speciﬁcation of outcomes and the design of an
appropriate governance structure. As we have shown, different
countries operate in their own speciﬁc contexts, and we would
not advocate an unproblematic ‘‘transposition’’ of this model onto
the Irish landscape of care provision. As Arnold (2007) notes, there
is huge diversity across countries with regard to welfare
provision. In considering these options, it is important to
remember that no country is in a position to completely reinvent
its welfare provision model, should it so choose. Legacies of
previous patterns and systems of service provision persist, for
example, the UK’s history is one that ranged from an older
‘‘command and control’’ model of state welfare provision, to a
market-‘‘liberal’’ model of contracting between state and service
provider (Salamon et al., 2000). Any abstract formula, such as
Sabel’s model, must always be carefully adapted to suit.
6. Conclusion
This paper has focused on the experiences of family carers in
the context of the Irish care system, which is characterised by a
local, ad hoc service model. By explicating the geographical
implications for service users on the ground, it is possible to see
that without tighter standards and structures in place, the service
landscape is subject to signiﬁcant geographical variation in access
and types of services available, and limited user portability.
Rather than advocating more command-and-control governance
of the nonproﬁt sector, the ﬁndings suggest that a middle-way
between tight accountability policy design and a hands-off
approach by the state could be met. An ‘experimentalist’ health
and social care system, as advocated by Sabel is proving very
successful in a range of different welfare settings. In particular,
with disability and care services, such a model promises a more
ﬂexible and partner-driven approach towards local service
delivery.
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